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CLASSIFICATIONS, IN WYOMING, OF INTEREST IN OIL AND
GAS FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Several recent Wyoming cases make an exploration into the field of
classification of the nature of oil and gas interests and the consequences
thereof especially worthwhile at this time. In addition, there are many
older cases that must be considered in order to present the current
Wyoming scheme of classifications. The Supreme Court of Wyoming draws
freely on authority from many jurisdictions having diverse theories concerning the nature of interests in oil and gas,' and it would be unwise to
assume the acceptance of all the ramifications of classification contained
in decisions of any one jurisdiction cited by the court. Therefore, this
article will, insofar as possible, deal with Wyoming decisions.
FEE SIMPLE INTERESTS, MINERAL ESTATE, MINERAL INTEREST

The most extensive bundle of rights with respect to oil and gas
interests is the fee simple interest. The old common law rule was that a
landowner owned everything within his boundaries both over and under
his land. Courts have long recognized that a mineral estate may be
reserved or severed from the surface estate 2 and that fee simple may be
created in the mineral estate. Justice Blume in the case of Picard v.
Richards3 said: "There may be an estate in mineral larger than a royalty
interest . . . which is called a mineral estate at times stated as a 'mineral
interest,' it is an estate in fee simple and to the minerals." Of course
all mineral estates are not fee simple interests. There can be interests
4
for a term of years or for life, or in fee simple defeasible.
The court in the earlier case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency 5
in speaking of a severed mineral estate said: "After severance, the two
estates, owned separately, are held by separate and distinct titles . . . the
two estates are 'as distinct as if they constituted two different parcels of
land' . . . (It) is not material that the plan by which the -properties are
separated is horizontal instead of vertical."
The court went on -to say: "Each estate may be occupied, conveyed,
encumbered, sold by the sheriff, or alloted in partition without any effect
upon the other." The court held upon the facts of the case that possession
of the surface of the land could not be adverse to the owner of the
severed mineral estate, as no minerals had been discovered and worked.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

An example of this is the case of Picard v. Richards, Wyo. 366 P.2d 119 (1961),
in which the Supreme Court of Wyoming cites cases from jurisdictions that follow
the ownership in place theory as well as nonownership theory jurisdictions.
An article in the Wyoming Law Journal, Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas
in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107 (1948), discusses some of the language used in the
earlier cases to sever mineral interests and speculates as to the situation in Wyoming
concerning what language would be necessary in order to sever or reserve a mineral
interest. There have been no new cases on the subject since the article was written.
366 P.2d 119 (1961).
Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 202.2; Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 493,
243 P.2d 163 (1952).
63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947).
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The case further held that the owner of a severed mineral estate, by his
title to such estate, has constructive possession necessary to bring an action
to quiet title.
The case of Milliron Oil Co. v. Connaghan6 is in agreement with the
Ohio Oil Co. case upon tile question of adverse possession. The Milliron
case further holds that a tax sale of the surface estate does not carry with
it the severed mineral estate, because if there has been no assessment taxes
made against the mineral estate there can be no delinquency and therefore no valid tax sale of the mineral estate can be made. However, it has
been held in another case, 7 that a gross products tax upon -production is a
tax upon the severed product which is personalty and therefore not a tax
upon real estate.
There are many consequences that flow from a fee simple mineral
estate classification. In the Picard cases the Wyoming Supreme Court
endorsed this language from a Texas case, 9 that is a good statement of
some of the more important consequences: "The ownership of an unrestricted mineral interest includes all the incidents of ownership, some
of which are the right to execute oil, gas and mineral leases and the right
to receive royalties." Perhaps the most important incident of ownership
of a mineral estate is to be able -to go upon the land to explore for and
develop and produce gas and oil or remove the minerals.' 0
Undivided interests in the mineral fee interest may be conveyed in
which case the holders of these interests become tenants in common, and
while each of these owners may exercise the incidents of ownership,
including the giving of a lease, one who does this has to account to any
nonconsenting cotenant for any profit made.' 1
There has been some confusion as to whether Wyoming is a nonownership theory state or an ownership in place theory state when considering the nature of the interest the landowner or the holder of a mineral
interest or estate has in the oil and gas underlying his property. Professors
Williams and Meyers in their treatise conclude that the theory held by a
state, as 'to the nature of ownership, has little significance apart from the
influence it may have upon the classification of mineral, royalty and leasehold interests as corporeal or incorporeal.' 2 As indicated below, Wyoming
seems to consider that the owner of the mineral estate owns the minerals
in place, although the court has designated a leasehold interest as an
14
incorporeal interest.' 3 Such a distintcion is not uncommon.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

76 Wyo. 330, 302 P.2d 256 (1956).
Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil Co., 70 Wyo. 263, 248 P.2d 198 (1952).
Picard v. Richards, Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).
Burns v. Andas, Tex. Civ. App., 231 S.W.2d 417 (1958).
Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 202.2.
Torgensen v. Connelly, Fyo., 348 P.2d 63 (1959).

12.
13.

Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 204.9.
See § III infra.

14.

Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 204.2.
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The Supreme Court of Wyoming freely cites authority from ownership
in place, nonownership and qualified ownership theory states, 15 but a
case has never turned upon the question of which theory applies in this
state. However, it does appear to this writer that the Wyoming Supreme
Court has adopted the ownership in place theory with respect to the
mineral fee owner. The court in the case of Denver Joint Stht. Ld. Bank
v. Dixon16 stated that the direct interest in and to the oil in place had
been reserved by the owner of the mineral interest, and in Picard v.
Richards17 the court said: "A conveyance or reservation thereof (speaking
here of a mineral interest) gives title to the minerals in place." The cases
of Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency' 8 and State ex rel. Cross v. Bd. Ld.
Corrs.19 also seem to support this theory.
ROYALTY INTEREST

Some of the greatest confusion in the classification of oil and gas
interests arises when the court must construe an ambiguous instrument in
order to determine if it creates a royalty interest or a mineral estate. The
Wyoming Supreme Court has said: "As we have had frequent occasion to
observe terms relating to conveyance of oil and gas interests have often
20
been loosely and inaccurately used."

A true royalty interest is a right to receive a certain amount of the
oil and gas produced from particular tracts of land. 2 ' It is an interest
carved out of the mineral fee estate.2 2 Of course the holder of a lease
may grant or reserve a royalty interest, but the lease has itself been carved
out of the mineral fee estate.2: A royalty interest granted or reserved by
the holder of a mineral fee estate, unless the right to participate in making
future leases is reserved or granted, is usually designated as a perpetual
non-participating interest,2 4 while a royalty granted or reserved by a
holder of a lease is designated as an overriding royalty, and it must be
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.

Picard v. Richards, Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).
Here the court cites cases
from Colorado, Montana, Texas and Mississippi, all ownership in place states and
from Louisiana, a nonowernship state and from Oklahoma, a qualified ownership
state. Denver Joint Stk. Ld. Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).
Here the court relied principally on cases from California which is a nonownership
state and Texas which is an ownership in place state. See Williams and Meyers,
Oil and Gas Law, at p. 31 for a table of classification of states as to theories concerning ownership in place of gas and oil.
57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).
Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).
63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947).
50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423 (1936).
Picard v. Richards, Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).
Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959); Picard v. Richards, ____Wyo.,
366 P.2d 119 (1961).
The court in the Dame case, supra, and in the case of
Denver Joint Stk. Ld. Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942), gives the
impression that it might call an assignment of oil and gas from no specified source a
royalty, but this would not be logical and the court in the later Picard case, supra,
used language that indicates that royalty interest is an interest that has relation
to a specific property.
Picard v. Richards, supra note 16.
Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959); Brenimer v. Cockburn, 254 F.2d
821 (10th Cir. 1958).
Denver Joint Etk. Ld. Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).
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satisfied out of production attributed to the interest held by the owner
of the lease.25
The distinguishing characteristics of a non-participating royalty
interest are: " (1) Such share of production is not chargeable with any of
costs of discovery and production; (2) the owner has no right to do any
act or thing to discover and produce the oil and gas; (3) the owner has no
right to grant leases; and (4) the owner has no right to receive bonuses
or delay rentals."26
A royalty interest is an interest in real property and as such it must
recorded
in order to be protected against a later purchaser in good
be
value.27
for
and
faith
Most of the important consequences of an interest being designated a
royalty interest are set out above; for it is very hard to separate the classification of an interest as a royalty interest from the consequences of such
classification. An example of this is that the distinguishing characteristics
of a non-participating royalty interest set out above are also the chief
consequences that flow from such classification; so in dealing with royalties a certain amount of circular reasoning is necessary. The court must
look both at the language the parties used to create the interest and to the
consequences the parties intended to flow from the transaction in order
to determine whether the parties have created a royalty interest or
mineral estate.
The instrument in the case of Picard v. Richards28 is a good example
of the loose language the courts must sometimes construe in order to
determine the nature of an interest created. Here the interest created
was described as "a life estate in a non-participating undivided one-fifth
of the mineral estate owned by the parties in the described lands and
premises." This language was further qualified by a statement that the
person retaining the remainder of the interest would have control over
the said one-fifth interest subject to accounting and full disclosure. This
sounds as though the parties intended to create a mineral estate with
authority for the execution of leases in one party. The court held that
while the owner of the interest described above had a mineral estate it
was an interest "in the nature of a royalty interest" and as such he had
no right to participate in bonus payments or delay rentals, but was
entitled only to a share of production.
There is one very troublesome area in the Picard case. After the
above described interest had been reserved, the parties executed an oil
lease retaining the usual one-eighth royalty interest. The court held that
the holder of the inerest under consideration was entitled to only one-fifth
25.
26.
27.
28.

Brenimer v. Cockburn, 254 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1958).
Picard v. Richards, Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).
Denver Joint Stk. Ld. Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).
v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959).
Wyo., 366 P.2d 119 (1961).

Dame
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of the one-eighth royalty interest or in other words one-fortieth of all
minerals produced. This confined to the facts of the case is alright for it
was conceded that this was the intent of the parties and the interest
created was in fact a mineral estate though "in the nature of a royalty
interest." However, the court then stated: "If she were entitled to onefifth or twenty percent of all the minerals produced, she would get all
of the one-eighth royalty specified in the lease to the California Company.
In addition to that, she would be entitled to 7
precent from someonenot the California Company. That is too irrational and the court cannot
accept such interpretation even without testimony in that connection."
This language is very disturbing for it sounds as if the court is saying
that a royalty interest must come out of the one-eighth royalty given as
consideration for a lease, when the generally accepted rule is that a royalty
29
owner is entitled to the stated fraction of all the oil and gas produced.
0
The court then cites the Oklahoma case of Cook v. McClellan as presenting a similar situation. However, the question in the Cook case is whether
the language considered created a royalty interest so that the holder of the
interest would receive a fraction of the total production from the land,
or a mineral interest so that the holder of the interest would only be
entitled to a fraction of the landowner's royalty. The Oklahoma court
held that under the facts of the case it created a mineral interest, and so,
for this reason, the holder of the interest was only entitled to a fraction
of the landowner's royalty. The rule in Oklahoma is that if the interest is
a royalty in the usual sense then the fraction applies to the total production of oil and gas.3 1
One very important consequence arising out of the fact that a royalty
interest has been designated an interest in real property is that in Denver
Joint Stk. Ld. Bank v. Dixon.3 2 The owner of the surface estate also
owned a royalty interest in the minerals which had been reconveyed to him
by the owner of the severed mineral esate. The owner of the surface
interest mortgaged the property to the bank by means of an ordinary
real estate mortgage describing the surface boundaries and with no mention
of the royalty interest. The court held that the royalty was also conveyed
by the mortgage as the interest was real property and had not been reserved.
From this it follows that if the owner of a surface estate, from which the
mineral estate has been severed, also owns a royalty interest in the same
lands, and if he wishes to keep the royalty interest, then he had better
specifically reserve it in any conveyance he might make of the surface
estate; for if he does not reserve the royalty interest, it will be conveyed
along with the surface estate.
OIL

AND

GAS

LEASE

A third very important interest in oil and gas is the lease.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 303.1.
Okla., 311 P.2d 244, 254 (1957).
Hooks v. Rocket Oil Co., 191 Okla. 431, 130 P.2d 846 (1942).
57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).

An oil
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and gas lease is not a lease in the same sense as a real estate lease. An oil
and gas lease is a right granted by the holder of the mineral estate giving
the lessee the authority to search for oil and gas and to remove either if
found. 33 There are surprisingly few Wyoming cases dealing with the
problems of classification of leasehold interests and the consequences
arising therefrom.
The leading case considering the nature of oil and gas leases in
Wyoming is Boatman v. Andre.34 The court in this case held that an oil
lease is a profit a prendre and therefore an incorporeal hereditament.
The court then said that while title to land cannot be lost by abandonment, a lease which is only an incorporeal hereditament may be abandoned.
The court, moreover, said that:: "Abandonment will be more readily found
in cases of oil and gas leases than in most other instances."
The attorney general of Wyoming, in an official opinion of November
6, 1952,3 5 stated that it was his opinion that a "lessee's interest under an
oil and gas lease, whether a producing lease, or not, is real property and
subject to taxation under the Inheritance Tax Laws of Wyoming, if
held by a deceased non-resident." This opinion was born out by the
later case of State v. Stringe 3 6 in which the court held that an oil and gas
lease, although only a profit a prende, created a "right" and as such was
an interest in land so that proper notice should have been given under
the applicable statute requiring notice be given to all persons claiming
any interest in any lands before such lands could be condemned.
Surprisingly the Wyoming Supreme Court has never had occasion
to decide a case on the basis of whether covenants could be implied in an
oil and gas lease. 37 Implied covenants are usually one of the most
important consequences of an interest in oil and gas being designated as
a lease since most jurisdictions recognize that there are certain obligations
implied in a lease. At any rate there is nothing to keep the court from
implying covenants in a proper situation as the local statute prohibiting
implied covenants in conveyances has been specifically amended to except
conveyances of oil, gas and other minerals. 38
OPERATING AGREEMENT

An operating agreement could almost be characterized as a contract;
it is less than a royalty interest and less than a lease. 39 Nevertheless, an
operating agreement can serve as a conveyance of an interest in oil and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370 (1932).
Ibid.
Official Opinions of Attorney General, p. 799 (1948-1953).
77 Wyo. 198, 310 P.2d 730.
A note at, 11 Wyo. L.J. 58 (1958), discusses this situation in detail. However,
Wyo. Stat. § 34-36 (1957), was amended subsequent to the time the note was
written.
Wyo. Stat. § 34-36 (1957).
Torgensen v. Connelly, Wyo., 348 P.2d 63 (1959).
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gas and as "oil and gas interest in land are real property," such an operat4o
ing agreement is within the statute of frauds.
In the case of Targesen v. Connelly41 the court had to construe an
operating agreement "for a term of twenty years and so long thereafter as
oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances are produced in commercial
quantities." This agreement was held to be a grant and sublease of the
exclusive right to drill upon property covered by a lease from the United
States. The court, describing the interest created, said: "It in effect
conveys a portion of the lease or the rights thereunder and constitutes real
property." Therefore, the instrument should have been recorded in the
county in which the land was located in order to be protected from the
rights of a subsequent bona fide purchaser.
MORTGAGES OF OTHER INTERESTS

IN OIL AND

GAS

There have been two recent cases concerning mortgages of oil and gas
interests. In the case of Elliott v. Sioux Oil C0.42 the court had to construe
an instrument called an "Assignment of Proceeds" which stated in its
pertinent parts. that it ". . . does hereby assign, transfer and set over unto
. . . (Black Hills) . . . the sum of . . . ($25,252.05) . . . payable from
proceeds from the sale of crude oil from . . . (leases located in Weston
County, Wyoming, and all other leases owned by assignor)." The issue in
the case was whether or not the above described instrument constituted
an interest in real property that would be recordable under the Wyoming
Statutes applicable to real property. If it were such an interest in real
property, then it would defeat a prior federal tax lien which had not
been filed in Weston County. The court held that although the "instrument would profit from refinement and precision" he was nevertheless led
to the conclusion that the instrument was executed as security for a debt
and as such it constituted a mortgage upon real estate and should be
recorded under the state laws relating to real estate.
4 3
The instrument in the case of Pheister v. Ogden Smelting Inc.
stated that it was a mortgage of an oil lease, together with all licenses,
easements, rights and privileges and all incomes, rents, royalties, proceeds,
profits and oil and gas produced from the mortgaged property. This
mortgage was properly recorded in the county in which the leased
property was located. The question the court had to consider was
whether or not this mortgage had priority over a mechanics lien arising
from work done on the lease after the mortgage had been recorded, insofar
as proceeds from oil produced after the work had been done were concerned. The court held that the mechanics lien had priority in this case
over the mortgage. The court said that the mortgage was a mortage of
"real estate" and entitled to be recorded as any other real estate mortgage.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Hageman v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919 (1951).
Wyo., 348 P.2d 63 (1959).
191 F. Supp. 847 (Wyo. 1960).
Wyo., 364 P.2d 1078 (1961).
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However, the part of the mortgage concerning the oil and gas produced
was held to be analogous to a mortgage of real estate together with the
rents, issues and profits thereof, and the general rule is that the mortagage
has no rights to such rents and profits until he has taken some action on
his part to reduce them to possession. Production was construed as being
analogous to profits.
It is thus clear from these cases that the important consequence of an
instrument being classified as a mortgage which extends to production is
that the courts consider such a mortgage a mortgage of real estate, and as
such it is subject to being recorded under the statutes pertaining to the
recording of conveyances of real estate. The fact that such a mortgage was
recorded did not help the mortgagee in the Pheister case, but the court in
that case did refer to a federal case 44 wherein the mortgage had procured
division and transfer orders and as such was held to be in constructive
possession so as to perfect a position of priority as to production. Therefore, it is apparent that a person who takes a mortagage of the oil and gas
produced, as in the Pheister case, must go further and also obtain a
division order or in some other way obtain constructive possession of the
production in order to have a meaningful interest.
BOBBIE

44.

J.
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Riverview State Bank v. Ernest, 198 F.2d 876, 34 A.L.R.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1952).
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